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COUNTRY Poland/Soviet Bloc

REPORT

SUBJECT The Polish Situation and Its Effect
on the Other Satellites

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a summary of the events in
Poland on 18-21 October 1956 and their effects on the other Satellites.

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Memo

Subject : The Polish situation and its effects upon the satellites

Radio Warsaw at 2300 hours on 21 October announced that the 8th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party (meeting since the morning of 19 October) had:

 nominated Gomulka as First-Secretary of the Central Committee, elected a new eight-member Political Office (see attachment) completely bare of representation by Stalinists (not even Marshal Rokossowski was picked),

 selected a commission to investigate the activities and possible guilt of Party leaders who in recent years were in charge of State Security units and functions, and

 approved the new political and economic aims of the Party (this will be made public by the newly elected Political Office).

The above Radio Warsaw broadcast was preceded by the following events:

The return of Gomulka and Spychalski¹ to membership on the Central Committee,

(¹ Former Political Office member and Assistant-Minister for Defense, with the rank of General, until 1948. When Gomulka fell in disfavor, Spychalski was stripped of his rank and positions, and arrested.)

a proposal by the outgoing Political Office that the nomination of 11 persons to the new Political Office be approved. This list of 11 did not include the name of Roskossowski.

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the unexpected arrival, and hasty departure, of a Soviet delegation composed of Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich. In all likelihood this group attempted to persuade the Polish communists to drop Rokossowski from the Political Office.

support of this interference by the probable arrival of high ranking Army officials (Marshal Koniev) in Poland to visit Soviet troop headquarters.

several people's rallies and demonstrations expressing approval of Gomulka's return to the political arena.

rumors concerning Soviet and Polish troop movements from their positions in the frontier regions of the country towards Warsaw, and rumors of their subsequent return to their bases.

The triumphal return by Gomulka to power along with the moderate nationalistic wing of Polish communism is the culmination of a phase of political evolution that began immediately after Stalin's death. This evolution was speeded up after the 20th Congress, coupled with the death of Bierut.

This evolution saw Polish communism about to break away from ■ Moscow domination, and revive a depressed Polish economy. The economic depression was caused by recent Soviet economic exploitation of Poland, and the national policy of forced industrialization.

The present situation has three essential facets: (1) - Polish internal affairs and policy, (2) - relations between the Satellite states and the Soviet Union, (3) - Soviet internal affairs.

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(1) - Polish internal Affairs and policy

The new United Workers Party leaders have assumed office with the apparent support of the communist masses and also of the Polish people. The party program (details still unrevealed) appears to be based upon the following concepts:

continuation of friendly relations with the USSR and the Satellites, but on a basis of complete equality.

acceleration of the democratic process within the Party and throughout Poland.

political elections based on an electoral law that allows a voter to choose from a list of candidates (however all candidates on the ballot will be selected in advance by agreement between the Party and the various recognized political parties and organizations).

changes in present agricultural policies and in economic principles in order to rapidly raise an extremely low standard of living.

In substance, this program probably goes beyond the suggested reforms and line laid down by the 20th Congress. Moreover this program implies that Gomulka's brand of socialism is politically to the right of that pursued by Tito and his "road to socialism". In fact the program resembles in essence the type of program followed by the socialist parties of the West.

If the nationalistic-toned demonstrations now underway in Poland do not degenerate into outright hostility to the USSR, thereby creating a rift between Poland and the USSR, the internal Polish situation should return to normal within a few days - days that probably will be marked by a degree of unrest and possibly a reshuffling of the Government Offices. Therefore, the new regime should be ready to attempt (within the present framework of alliances) the reconstruction of Poland's economy and morale.

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(2) - Relations between the USSR and the satellites

The present stand taken by Poland can be compared with the step taken by Tito. However, there is one difference: Tito broke a tradition by rebelling against Stalin whom he faced as an equal. Instead Gomulka based his position upon the principles of equality which the Kremlin accepted at Belgrade in 1955, and which was reconfirmed at the 20th Congress held in February 1956.

This means that the Polish position does not constitute a revolt and that Khrushchev and the Soviet collective leadership cannot fight Gomulka with the same bitterness with which Stalin engaged Tito. However, the fact remains that since 21 October, Poland is no longer a satellite of the USSR but, solely an ally of the USSR. This is a result of the present Kremlin policy which calls for an improvement of relations with Tito and de-Stalinization.

Logically, one may ask if the Polish case is an isolated example, and if this action will damage Soviet prestige and plans.

All of this raises the thought that the Polish lead will naturally be followed by other Satellites, even if not so dramatically. This, however, should not cause any substantial damage to Soviet foreign policy unless Moscow commits other big mistakes such as the attempt to exert pressure upon the Central Committee of the United Workers Party (P.Z.P.R.). Actually the transition from Satellites to allies could conceivably assist communist expansion in the West by furnishing effective propaganda arguments for the Soviet political penetration program.

Militarily speaking, this transition should not weaken the defensive positions of the Soviet bloc (all the communist countries undoubtedly are interested in defending their personal political regimes). But it could delay offensive aims since not all of the Satellites, ^eone they have gained the status of allies, could be convinced that they should face the risk of a war.

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In substance, therefore, the transformation of the satellites to allies might increase the danger of peaceful communist penetration, and at the same time diminish the ^{threat} ~~threat~~ of a military offensive launched by the Soviet bloc.

(3) - Soviet internal affairs

The loss suffered by the Soviet Delegation to Warsaw, combined with the probable checkmate suffered in the Khrushchev-Tito discussions, and the situation created in Eastern Europe following de-Stalinization, places the present collective leadership of the USSR in a delicate position.

It is now clear that Molotov's contention was correct, i.e., the new Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis the Satellites has brought about a situation where the Kremlin no longer controls the overall scene. The inopportune trip to Warsaw by the Soviet delegation proves this statement.

At present [] what steps the Kremlin could take to re- 25X1 establish strict control without resort to cruel measures and consequent upheaval. Nor [] how the Central Committee of the CPSU can 25X1 accept a state of affairs in which the prestige of the Soviet Communist Party is decreased.

On the other hand, the lack of good judgment that prevails (for example, who ordered the trip to Warsaw, Khrushchev ? Molotov?) can only lead [] a new encounter very soon between the Stalinist group 25X1 and the Khrushchev wing.

In any case, it is doubtful (even if Molotov were victorious) that any possibility exists for a marked change in the general political line established at the 20th Congress. What can be expected, however, is for the USSR to strengthen her economic ties with the Satellites now that she has seen the political ties weaken. This shoring up, and extension of, economic relations will occur both through the Council for reciprocal economic aid as well as in direct aid (Poland and Hungary have recently received loans of 100 million rubles each).

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Attachment One.

First-Secretary of the Central Committee: Gomulka.

Members of the Political Office of the Central Committee.

Josef Cyrankiewicz

Edward Ochab

Adam Rapacki

Alexandre Zawadski

(and these new members),

Wladislaw Gomulka

Stefan Jendrychowski

Ignace Loga-Sowinski

Jerzy Morawski

Members of the Central Committee Secretariat:

Jerzy Albrecht

Edward Gierek

Witold Jarosinski

Wladislaw Matwin

Edward Ochab

Roman Zambrowski (former member of the Central Committee, but,
newly assigned to the Secretariat)

Josef Cyrankiewicz

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He has been President of the Council of Ministers

since March 1954.

Wladislaw Gomulka

A key figure in the communist party, Gomulka became Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, and Secretary of the Polish Communist Party immediately after World War II.

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Stefan Jendrychowski


Ignace Loga-Sowinski

Jerzy Morawski

)
) former members of the Organizational
) Office of the Polish Communist Party.
)

Edward Ochab


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Ochab was chosen First-Secretary of the Central Committee of the party on 12 March 1956, shortly after the death of Bierut.

Adam Rapacki



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Rapacky became Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 1956.

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He has been a member of the Politburo since March 1951.

Alexander Zawadzki

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In 1952 he was chosen President of the Council of State

(President of the Republic).

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Witold Yarosinski

Minister of Education since July 1950.

Wladislaw Matwin

Member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party
and Secretary of the party since 26 January 1955.

Roman Zambrowski

Member of the State Council and secretary of the Party since
1951.

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General Wacław Komar

Komar returned to the scene (rehabilitated) in April 1956. He
was named commanding officer of the Polish police forces on 25 August
1956.

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Note: General Spychalski is also a candidate for possible assignment
to the Ministry of Defense.

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